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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Rotating custody, also known as joint, alternating, divided, split, 
and shared1 custody, is defined as shared physical custody of a minor 
child and shared parental responsibility.2 In rotating custody ar-
rangements, the child lives with each parent for a substantial 
amount of time, or at least thirty percent of the time.3 Some authori-
ties define rotating custody more strictly, limiting the definition to an 
arrangement where each parent has custody of the child fifty percent 
of the time.4 Because, however, Florida courts and other authorities 
consider custody arrangements providing that the child lives with 
each parent for a substantial period of time to be rotating, this Com-
ment follows the more flexible definitions of the term.5 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2003, Florida State University College of Law; B.A., summa 
cum laude, College of Charleston, 2000. 
 1. Nelson v. Osgood, 689 So. 2d 1286, 1286 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); GROUP FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, COMM. ON THE FAMILY, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY AND THE 
FAMILY 930 (1980) [hereinafter GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY]. 
 2. See Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). 
 3. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL REP. 102, THE CASE FOR JOINT CUSTODY 16 (1985) 
[hereinafter CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL]; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, 
supra note 1, at 930. 
 4. Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 1049, 1051-52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Cynthia A. 
McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender Bias in the Family 
Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 951 (1998). 
 5. Bracken v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 747, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (affirming the 
trial court’s final judgment of dissolution providing that the father have custody of the 
child for eleven consecutive days each month); Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1996) (affirming the trial court’s order that the father have custody of the child 
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 Rotating custody means more than just alternating the physical 
custody of the child. It also means that the parents have equal child-
rearing rights and responsibilities.6 Rotating custody arrangements 
allow the parents to continue to share authority over the child, just 
as they did in the marriage.7 Therefore, “neither parent is in a posi-
tion to unilaterally impose his or her will on the other parent.”8 Fur-
thermore, because each parent retains the authority to make deci-
sions for the child, the parents must be able to cooperate for a rotat-
ing custody arrangement to benefit the family.9 
 Courts have consistently been reluctant to order rotating custody 
or to enforce agreements between the parents providing for rotating 
custody. For example, both the Roman law and the English common 
law preferred giving the father sole custody when the marriage ter-
minated.10 This presumption was so obstinately adhered to that the 
“law would not give effect to . . . the paternal right . . . being bar-
gained away.”11 In other words, upon dissolution of the marriage, the 
parents were not allowed to agree that the mother would have cus-
tody of the children. Instead, because the father was entitled to his 
child’s earnings and services and because the law obligated the fa-
ther to maintain and support his child, custody of the child was al-
ways awarded to the father.12 
 In the early 1800s, some English courts began to abandon the idea 
of absolute paternal rights to custody and started enforcing rotating 
custody agreements to accomplish the goals of giving “both parents a 
fair intercourse with [the children]” and of encouraging an “affec-
tionate regard for the character and person of both [parents].”13 Al-
though rotating custody was sanctioned as early as 1848 in Eng-
land,14 the courts subsequently adopted a preference for awarding 
sole custody of children under fourteen to the mother.15 Finally, in 
                                                                                                                    
during the eighth, eleventh, and twelfth grades and that the mother have custody of the 
child during the ninth and tenth grades); CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 
15-17; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 1, at 930; MEL 
MORGENBESSER & NADINE NEHLS, JOINT CUSTODY: AN ALTERNATIVE FOR DIVORCING 
FAMILIES 30-31 (1981). 
 6. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 30. 
 7. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 16. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 17. 
 10. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 6; LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO 
DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at 174 (1990). 
 11. STONE, supra note 10, at 174. 
 12. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 6. 
 13. STONE, supra note 10, at 177 (quoting an unidentified source). 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. at 180. 
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1925, England enacted a statute providing that custody was to be de-
termined based on the welfare of the child.16 
 Similarly, a majority of the states adopted the common law rule of 
absolute paternal control, but abandoned the notion for the first time 
in 1839.17 As in England, most American courts then began endorsing 
rotating custody arrangements, but this preference was short-lived.18 
Courts subsequently began to regularly award custody to the 
mother,19 but in 1889 the Kansas Supreme Court first held that cus-
tody arrangements should be decided based on the child’s welfare 
and best interest.20 
 Florida jurisprudence has followed a similar historical pattern. In 
Randolph v. Randolph,21 the Florida Supreme Court explicitly abro-
gated the common law presumption that the father had a superior 
right to the custody of his children. Even prior to Randolph’s overt 
abolition of the preference for awarding custody to the father, the 
Florida courts had deviated from the common law rule several 
times.22 However, contrary to the pattern established in England and 
in other states after the abolition of the paternal control presump-
tion, the Florida courts were not partial to rotating custody arrange-
ments, even for a short period of time.23 Instead, the Florida Supreme 
Court was so opposed to the idea of rotating custody that it articu-
lated a presumption against rotating custody arrangements in 1943 
                                                                                                                    
 16. Id. 
 17. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 6. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 7. 
 20. Id.  
 21. 1 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1941). 
 22. See Fields v. Fields, 197 So. 530, 531 (Fla. 1940) (awarding the mother sole cus-
tody of the three-year-old, and custody of the five and seven-year-olds for nine months out 
of the year); Green v. Green, 188 So. 355, 356 (Fla. 1939) (affirming an award of custody of 
a three-year-old girl to the mother); Putnam v. Putnam, 186 So. 517, 518 (Fla. 1939) 
(affirming the modified decree of divorce which awarded custody to the mother for ten 
months out of the year); Frazier v. Frazier, 147 So. 464, 467-68 (Fla. 1933) (remanding 
with instructions to award custody to the father for not less than three months in each 
year); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 134 So. 201, 204 (Fla. 1931) (affirming award of custody to the 
mother for eight months each year); Osceola Fertilizer Co. v. Sauls, 123 So. 780, 780-81  
(Fla. 1929); Trigo v. Trigo, 105 So. 123, 123 (Fla. 1925); Harris v. Harris, 61 So. 122, 122 
(Fla. 1913). 
 23. From 1943 to 1985 only three rotating custody agreements were ordered. Watson 
v. Watson, 15 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1943); Alexander v. Alexander, 473 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1985); Oldaker v. Oldaker, 263 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). Since the Alexander deci-
sion, Florida appellate courts have affirmed rotating custody arrangements only eight 
times. Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Voorhies v. Voorhies, 705 
So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bracken v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1998); O’Brien v. Crumley, 695 So. 2d 881, 882-83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Harpman v. 
Harpman, 694 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 619 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 604 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Parker 
v. Parker, 553 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). 
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in Phillips v. Phillips.24 From 1943 until 1997, the Florida courts 
abided by the presumption that rotating custody is not in the best in-
terests of a minor child, and only affirmed rotating custody arrange-
ments a handful of times.25 
 In 1997 the Florida Legislature enacted section 61.121 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, which provides that “[t]he court may order rotating cus-
tody if the court finds that rotating custody will be in the best inter-
est of the child.”26 Between May 23, 1997, and September 22, 1999, 
four awards of rotating custody were affirmed.27 In other words, after 
the courts were ostensibly granted permission to order rotating cus-
tody, they affirmed four orders in twenty-eight short months.28 How-
ever, prior to the enactment of section 61.121, the courts had af-
firmed only a few orders in fifty-four years.29  
 Curiously, though, the Second District Court of Appeal, in 1999, 
reined in the Florida courts’ apparent freedom to grant rotating cus-
tody.30 In Mandell v. Mandell, the court, in dicta, stated that 
“[n]othing in the plain language of [section 61.121] suggests that the 
legislature intended to abolish the presumption” against rotating 
custody.31 The court reasoned that because the legislative history of 
House Bill 1421, which enacted section 61.121, explicitly set aside 
another presumption found in section 61.13, “the legislature under-
stood how to set aside a previously established presumption.”32 
Therefore, because House Bill 1421 did not also include language 
that unambiguously set aside the common law presumption against 
rotating custody, the court concluded that the presumption was not 
abolished by the legislation.33 Since the Mandell decision, Florida 
courts have only ordered one rotating custody arrangement.34 
 Part II of this Comment examines the origin and evolution of Flor-
ida’s presumption against rotating custody arrangements. The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of such arrangements are also evaluated 
in Part II, including the psychological effects of rotating custody on 
minor children. Finally, Part III proffers a framework to guide the 
judicial system’s implementation of rotating custody orders. 
                                                                                                                    
 24. 13 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 1943). 
 25. See supra note 23. 
 26. FLA. STAT. § 61.121 (2002). 
 27. See supra note 23. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Mandell v. Mandell, 741 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). 
 31. Id. at 618. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 
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II.   THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF FLORIDA’S PRESUMPTION 
AGAINST ROTATING CUSTODY 
 Florida courts have never been inclined to order rotating custody 
arrangements, and, instead, have usually awarded custody to one 
parent and granted visitation rights to the other parent.35 The pre-
sumption against rotating custody originated in 1943 in Phillips v. 
Phillips.36 The Florida courts embraced the Phillips court’s absolute 
presumption against rotating custody, but gradually began to con-
sider various factors when determining whether to order rotating 
custody instead of unquestionably applying the presumption. 
A.   The Origin 
 Phillips was the first decision to demonstrate Florida’s opposition 
to dividing the minor child’s physical custody between the parents. 
Upon granting Beatrice M. Phillips’s request for divorce, the judge 
awarded custody of the seventeen-month-old boy to the father.37 Mrs. 
Phillips appealed, arguing that the custody order should be modi-
fied.38 The appellate court agreed with Mrs. Phillips and awarded 
custody of the boy to the father for the first week of every month and 
to Mrs. Phillips for the remainder of the time.39 The Florida Supreme 
Court, however, sided with Mr. Phillips on appeal and reversed the 
appellate court’s modification of the original custody decree.40 
 The Court refused to uphold the modification order because the 
condition precedent to the modification of a final decree of custody, 
that the arrangement be “for the welfare of the child,” was not satis-
fied.41 The court reasoned that dividing custody of the child between 
the parents would be detrimental to the child’s welfare because “no 
man can serve two masters and it is certainly true that no child can 
pursue a normal life when subject to the the [sic] precepts, example 
and control of first one person and then another, regardless of how 
well intentioned those persons may be.”42 The court extrapolated the 
idea that dividing custody confused the child from its “experience” 
and from its “common knowledge of man and affairs.”43 No other 
source of authority supported the court’s conclusion. 
                                                                                                                    
 35. See supra note 23. 
 36. 13 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1943). 
 37. Id. at 922. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 923. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
508  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:503 
 
B.   The Early Evolution: 1943-1975 
 Although the presumption against rotating custody originated as 
a product of judicial policymaking and was not based on precedent, 
the concept quickly had a strong influence on the Florida courts. Af-
ter 1943, the majority of judges unquestionably applied the presump-
tion against rotating custody, deriving it either from Phillips and 
other Florida decisions,44 from their experience and common knowl-
edge,45 or from other states’ judicial decisions.46 Between 1943 and 
1975, most courts employed similar language and, so long as both 
parents were equally fit, failed to articulate any rationale for the 
presumption.47 Even as late as 1975, most courts were still blindly 
applying the rule that “unquestionably split custody decrees . . . are 
not encouraged.”48 During this time period, only a few decisions devi-
ated from the rule against rotating custody.49  
 Five months after the Florida Supreme Court first announced its 
hostility toward divided custody in Phillips, the court affirmed a ro-
tating custody arrangement in Watson v. Watson.50 Watson involved 
the mother’s appeal of the final decree of divorce that awarded cus-
tody of the two girls to the father for six months and to the mother 
for six months.51 The court rejected the mother’s request for full cus-
tody and affirmed the rotating custody arrangement because both 
parents could provide the girls with equal opportunities.52 Further-
more, because both the mother and the father were employed outside 
the home, the court’s usual preference for awarding custody to the 
mother was not applicable.53 
 The court in Oldaker v. Oldaker54 also declined to exercise the 
presumption against rotating custody. Upon dissolution of the mar-
riage, the court ordered the parents to share custody of their three-
                                                                                                                    
 44. Stewart v. Stewart, 24 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. 1946); Jones v. Jones, 23 So. 2d 623, 
625 (Fla. 1945); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Unger v. 
Unger, 306 So. 2d 540, 541-42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Julian v. Julian, 188 So. 2d  896, 897, 
902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Rudolph v. Rudolph, 146 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). But 
cf. Ritsi v. Ritsi, 160 So. 2d 159, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (overturning a reversal of a shared 
custody agreement and reinstating the original decree of shared custody). 
 45. Hurst v. Hurst, 27 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1946). 
 46. Rudolph, 146 So. 2d at 399. 
 47. See supra note 44; see also Phillips, 13 So. 2d at 922. 
 48. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d at 499. 
 49. Watson v. Watson, 15 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1943); Oldaker v. Oldaker, 263 So. 2d 
250, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Lindgren v. Lindgren, 220 So. 2d 440, 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1969). 
 50. 15 So. 2d at 447. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (“If she goes and returns as a wage earner like the father, she has no more 
part in this responsibility than he and it necessarily follows that all things else being 
equal, she has no better claim when the matter of custody is at issue.”). 
 54. 263 So. 2d at 250. 
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year-old, rotating physical custody of the child every three months.55 
Both parents appealed the rotating custody arrangement, but the 
court affirmed the custody order saying “[i]n view of the child’s ten-
der age of three, we do not feel that such an arrangement is against 
the child’s best interest or welfare. . . . Perhaps a different arrange-
ment will be necessitated when the child reaches school age.”56 
 Lindgren v. Lindgren57 is another decision that disregarded the 
presumption against rotating custody. The mother appealed an order 
awarding custody to the father for four days one week and three days 
the next week.58 The court agreed that the general rule was not to af-
firm rotating custody orders, but recognized an exception to the gen-
eral rule because the mother had an extramarital relationship.59 In 
other words, because the father was more fit than the mother, the 
preference of awarding custody to the mother did not apply and ro-
tating custody was acceptable.60 Lindgren was the first case to recog-
nize the presumption against rotating custody and then limit its ap-
plication based on the circumstances of the case.61 
C.   Modern Evolution: 1975-1997 
 Between 1975 and July 1, 1997, the courts further developed the 
Lindgren principle that “the prohibition against alternating custody 
is not absolute.”62 Because the presumption was no longer “a rule of 
law,” and instead became “an exercise of discretion by the trial 
court,” the appellate courts were faced with the task of determining 
“whether reasonable men could differ as to whether or not rotating 
custody, under the circumstances of [the] case, is in the best interest 
of the children.”63 Some courts applied various factor tests when de-
ciding whether the circumstances of the case overcame the presump-
tion against rotating custody.64 Others determined whether to order 
                                                                                                                    
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 220 So. 2d 440, 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. at 440-41. 
 61. Id.; see also Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, 240 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) 
(“Split custody can be condoned if there are special circumstances or legally unequal facts 
present to support such an arrangement.”). 
 62. Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). 
 63. Id. 
 64. E.g., MacConnell v. Cascante, 668 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Garvie v. 
Garvie, 659 So. 2d 394, 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Langford v. Ortiz, 654 So. 2d 1237, 1238 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Caraballo v. Hernandez, 623 So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); 
Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Parker v. Parker, 553 So. 2d 
309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d at 1151; Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 
So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). 
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rotating custody based on the facts of the case, but did not apply a 
specific factor test when making that evaluation.65 
 Bienvenu v. Bienvenu66 was the first decision to delineate factors 
justifying a rotating custody order:  
Such factors might include, for example, older and more mature 
children, parents who live near each other or are willing to cooper-
ate in lessening the impact of the changes in custody, and a divi-
sion of periods of custody which is related to actual events in the 
children’s lives, such as between school and holiday periods.67 
 Although the court recognized that the presumption against rotat-
ing custody was not absolute, it reversed the order of rotating cus-
tody because two of the three factors justifying rotating custody were 
not satisfied; the children were two and four-years-old and the par-
ents were very antagonistic toward each other.68 
 Gerscovich v. Gerscovich69 clarified and added new considerations 
to the Bienvenu factors.70 In addition to a division of periods of cus-
tody that relate to actual events in the child’s life, another factor that 
courts take into account when deciding whether to allow rotating 
custody is the reasonableness of the “length of each period of cus-
tody.”71 Furthermore, the child’s preference, considered in light of the 
child’s maturity level, should also be weighed.72 Gerscovich also 
broadened the Bienvenu factor of the proximity of the parents’ homes 
to include any “disruptive influence[] created by differing surround-
ings in alternate custody periods.”73 Finally, Gerscovich clarified the 
Bienvenu consideration of the parents’ willingness to cooperate, by 
                                                                                                                    
 65. E.g., Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 
604 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1991); Chiafair v. Chiafair, 552 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); ex rel. 
S.M.H., 531 So. 2d 228, 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Gerner v. Gerner, 529 So. 2d 1226, 1226 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Alexander v. Alexander, 473 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Ele-
bash v. Elebash, 450 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Tallent v. Tallent, 440 So. 2d 
623, 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Frey v. Wagner, 433 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Scott 
v. Scott, 401 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Garvey v. Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172, 1173 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1980). 
 66. 380 So. 2d at 1165. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1164-66. 
 69. 406 So. 2d 1151. 
 70. Id. at 1151, 1153. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1152. Contra Garvey v. Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) 
(“Although the preference of a child is one factor to be considered, it cannot control the dis-
position of custody.”). 
 73. 406 So. 2d at 1151; see also Harpman v. Harpman, 694 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1997) (“[A] [f]actor[] that influenced the parties to agree to, and the court to approve, 
rotating custody [was] . . . the fact that the children would attend the same school regard-
less of which household they were residing in.”); Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717, 719 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (“Rotating custody between two distant cities should not be imposed 
when the child is of school age.”). 
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stating that this factor also includes how the children will perceive 
the parents’ attitudes toward each other.74 
 Several other factors that overcome the presumption against ro-
tating custody were also set forth during this time period. First, 
courts more frequently order rotating custody when the child is not 
yet old enough to go to school.75 Second, psychological or Guardian Ad 
Litem reports recommending rotating custody militate in favor of ro-
tating custody.76 The idea that animosity between the parents also 
overcomes the presumption against rotating custody was first intro-
duced in 1992 in Sullivan v. Sullivan.77 The court reasoned that the 
mother’s hostile attitude supported rotating custody in order to pre-
vent the mother from turning the child against the father.78 This fac-
tor, however, does not usually support rotating custody and, con-
versely, is a circumstance that weighs in favor of the application of 
the presumption against rotating custody.79 
 Despite establishing that the presumption against rotating cus-
tody is not absolute, courts during this era continued to sparingly or-
der rotating custody. During these twenty-two years, courts ordered 
rotating custody less than ten times.80 Two of the orders were to ter-
minate upon the child reaching school age.81 Three were ordered, in 
part, because the children were sufficiently mature to state their 
preferences.82 One order of rotating custody was ordered because of 
                                                                                                                    
 74. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d at 1151. 
 75. See, e.g., Mooney v. Mooney, 729 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Bracken 
v. Bracken, 704 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Langford v. Ortiz, 654 So. 2d 1237, 
1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Parker v. Parker, 553 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Alex-
ander v. Alexander, 473 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). But see Hurst v. Hurst, 27 So. 
2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1946) (“[W]e have grave doubt that an infant three years old can develop 
normally and thrive if at the end of every six months he is removed from surroundings fa-
miliar to him and forced to become accustomed to new ones.”). 
 76. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Crumley, 695 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). But cf. 
Garvie v. Garvie, 659 So. 2d 394, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). See also Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 
2d 617, 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Contra Garvey, 383 So. 2d at 1173 (“[A] trial court does 
not surrender its discretion to psychologists or other experts testifying concerning the wel-
fare of children where best interests are to be protected by the court.”). 
 77. 604 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Lamelas v. Granados, 
730 So. 2d 387, 388-89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Bracken, 704 So. 2d at 748; Garvie, 659 So. 2d 
at 396; Caraballo v. Hernandez, 623 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Bienvenu v. Bi-
envenu, 380 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). 
 80. Quinn v. Settel, 682 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 
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the mother’s animosity toward the father,83 and one was ordered 
simply because special circumstances justified the arrangement.84 
D.   Section 61.121, Florida Statutes, is Enacted 
 On July 1, 1997, section 61.121, Florida Statutes, became effec-
tive.85 The section provides that “[t]he court may order rotating cus-
tody if the court finds that rotating custody will be in the best inter-
est of the child.”86 Between July 1, 1997, and September 22, 1999, 
Florida appellate courts affirmed rotating custody orders three 
times.87 Following the examples from Lindgren,88 Bienvenu,89 and 
Gerscovich,90 the courts during this period also considered the special 
circumstances of each case.91 In both Mooney v. Mooney,92 and 
Bracken v. Bracken,93 the courts’ decisions to uphold the rotating cus-
tody orders were influenced by the fact that the rotating arrange-
ment would terminate when the children reached school age.94 The 
third affirmation of rotating custody occurred because there were no 
substantial changes in circumstance requiring modification of the 
original rotating custody order.95 
1.   The Florida Courts’ Reaction to Section 61.121 
 On September 22, 1999, the Second District Court of Appeal, in 
Mandell v. Mandell,96 interpreted section 61.121 for the first time. 
The court affirmed the trial court’s rotating custody order because 
the husband rebutted “any presumption against rotating custody.”97 
However, the decision’s dicta, and not the holding, most greatly im-
pacted Florida’s rotating custody jurisprudence. In dicta, the court 
went on to answer the parties’ question of “whether section 61.121, 
Florida Statutes (1997), effectively sets aside the long held presump-
tion that rotating custody is not in the best interest of a minor 
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child.”98 The court concluded that the statute’s plain language did not 
indicate that the legislature meant to abolish the presumption, or, al-
ternatively, if it did intend to abolish the presumption it failed to ap-
propriately do so.99 The court considered the fact that the bill enact-
ing section 61.121 also enacted section 61.13, which provides that 
“[n]o presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relo-
cate when a primary residential parent seeks to move the child and 
the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact and 
access with the secondary residential parent.”100 According to the 
Second District Court of Appeal, this language demonstrated that the 
legislature understood how to abolish a presumption, and “[t]he ab-
sence of such language in section 61.121 leads us to conclude that ei-
ther the legislature did not intend to set aside the presumption, or, if 
it did, it failed to appropriately implement its intent.”101 
 Since Mandell, the Florida appellate courts have affirmed rotating 
custody orders only two more times.102 These courts affirmed the ro-
tating custody decrees because “[t]he [trial] court found the agree-
ment was in the child’s best interest”103 and because an expert wit-
ness recommended rotating custody.104 Although the Florida Su-
preme Court has not yet validated the dicta in Mandell, the case was 
cited favorably by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Mancuso v. 
Mancuso,105 and in Hosein v. Hosein.106 
E.   The Advantages of Rotating Custody 
 There are numerous advantages to rotating custody. First, rotat-
ing custody can benefit both the parents and the child by fulfilling 
their desires to maintain a close relationship.107 The concept of rotat-
ing custody recognizes the equal authority of both parents by allow-
ing each parent to actively participate in the child’s life.108 Because 
neither parent is treated as the visiting parent, the parent-child rela-
tionship is less likely to change.109 In contrast, when one parent only 
has infrequent visitation rights, the parent-child relationship can be 
drastically altered.110 The child, for example, may feel like he or she 
                                                                                                                    
 98. Id. at 617-18. 
 99. Id. at 618. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Boardman v. Roy, 775 So. 2d 334, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 
2d 1049, 1051-52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). 
 103. Goins, 762 So. 2d at 1051. 
 104. Boardman, 775 So. 2d at 334. 
 105. 789 So. 2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
 106. 785 So. 2d 703, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
 107. DEBORAH ANNA LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY 42 (1982). 
 108. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 62. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 61. 
514  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:503 
 
has been abandoned by the nonresidential parent.111 One study of 
four rotating custody families revealed that “[n]one of the children 
seemed to experience the severe loss of one parent reported in tradi-
tional custodial arrangements.”112 Therefore, rotating custody ar-
rangements help to minimize the child’s feeling of abandonment be-
cause “[b]oth parents remain active participants in their child’s up-
bringing through their input into decisions . . . and the child knows 
that both parents are available to give advice and guidance.”113 
 Another way that rotating custody benefits the parent-child rela-
tionship is by eliminating the parents’ need to compete for custody of 
the child, thereby removing the possibility that the child will be 
forced to choose one parent as the residential parent.114 This com-
pelled decision can be emotionally difficult for the child, especially 
when the child has a positive relationship with both parents.115 Addi-
tionally, when parents agree to rotating custody arrangements the 
child is not exposed to “the legal custody battles and adversarial cli-
mate that surround sole custody contests.”116 Rotating custody ar-
rangements, therefore, allow the child to continue a relationship with 
both parents and remove the dilemma of a loyalty conflict.117 
 Yet another benefit of rotating custody for children is the fact that 
the parents are forced to cooperate.118 Although the negative effects 
of divorce will always impact the child, the child’s attitude about the 
experience may be more positive if the parents are amicable.119 Chil-
dren subject to a rotating custody arrangement may, therefore, feel 
more optimistic about their future male-female relationships than 
will children subject to sole custody arrangements.120 Additionally, 
children subject to rotating custody arrangements will be better pre-
pared for future relationships because it is more likely that they will 
see each parent assume the roles of both a housekeeper and a wage 
earner.121 Because parents today are more apt to share these roles, 
the sole custody arrangement, patterned after the “traditional family 
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roles of the mother as sole homemaker and the father as the only 
breadwinner,” does not provide role models compatible with modern 
family life.122  
 Parents also benefit from rotating custody arrangements. Most 
importantly, neither parent experiences the sense of loss and uncer-
tainty about his or her parental role that is present in sole custody 
arrangements.123 In addition to the loss of the child, the nonresiden-
tial parent may also suffer from a loss of self-esteem.124 “If one parent 
is awarded primary custody after litigation, the visiting parent can-
not help feeling that he or she has been judged the worse, or at least 
the less adequate, of the two parents.”125 Rotating custody arrange-
ments can ameliorate the sense of loss, role ambiguity, and the loss 
of self-confidence.126 
 Another advantage of rotating custody arrangements is that the 
one parent no longer must shoulder the childrearing burden by him-
self or herself. Rotating custody involves a situation where each par-
ent is equally responsible for the physical and emotional develop-
ment of the child.127 Both parents have an equal voice in the major 
decisions of the child’s life.128 Therefore, rotating custody “means be-
ing free and a parent at the same time” because each parent has “100 
percent of the responsibility 50 percent of the time [rather] than 50 
percent of the responsibility 100 percent of the time.”129 
 Rotating custody also may avoid some of the conflicts associated 
with sole custody arrangements.130 For example, a custody battle is 
not necessary and is instead replaced with an arrangement requiring 
cooperation and compromise.131 Moreover, because both parents have 
equal authority, neither parent will resent the other’s dominance, a 
feeling experienced by many parents in sole custody arrangements.132 
 Besides benefiting both the children and the parents, rotating cus-
tody is also advantageous to the courts.133 So long as the parents re-
quest rotating custody and are both fit and competent, the judge is 
not required to spend time evaluating the reasons why one parent is 
more competent than the other.134 Therefore, judicial energy and time 
                                                                                                                    
 122. Id. 
 123. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 153; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, 
supra note 1, at 930; Felner & Terre, supra note 116, at 127. 
 124. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 153. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 1, at 930.  
 128. Id. 
 129. LUEPNITZ, supra note 107, at 43. 
 130. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 152. 
 131. MORGENBESSER & NEHLS, supra note 5, at 66. 
 132. GARDNER, supra note 121, at 152. 
 133. Felner & Terre, supra note 116, at 127. 
 134. Id. 
516  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:503 
 
are conserved when parents are appropriate candidates for rotating 
custody arrangements. 
F.   The Disadvantages of Rotating Custody 
 Opponents of rotating custody have cited various disadvantages of 
such an arrangement. The primary criticism of the Florida courts is 
that rotating custody is confusing to the child because each parent 
has different rules and the child will not know which ones to obey.135 
“[N]o child can pursue a normal life when subject to the the [sic] pre-
cepts, example and control of first one person and then another, re-
gardless of how well intentioned those persons may be.”136 Other au-
thorities also recognize the concern that having two homes creates an 
unpredictable and interrupted life for a child.137 Critics argue that 
such disruption will affect the child physically and emotionally.138 
However, this argument has been rejected by studies of rotating cus-
tody families. For example, one study concluded that after an initial 
adjustment period, the children were no longer confused about 
changing domiciles.139 Another source stated that although frequent 
change is disruptive, children generally adapt well to change and are 
not harmed by shifting homes.140 
 Another common grievance about rotating custody is that children 
may be used as ammunition in parental battles.141 For example, one 
parent may prohibit visitation when a support payment is overdue.142 
Additionally, either or both parents may bargain and beg for more 
time with the child.143 Using a child this way can result in divided 
loyalties and psychological damage.144 However, the same difficulties 
may be even more pronounced in sole custody arrangements because 
nonresidential parents do not have as much authority as residential 
parents and therefore, are more likely to need to use the children in-
appropriately.145 Rotating custody arrangements, in contrast, involve 
shared parental authority and decision-making, thereby minimizing 
the need to use the children as pawns.146 
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 Critics of rotating custody also recognize the daily inconveniences 
for children. For example, a child may not be able to fall asleep at 
night because his or her favorite toy is at the other parent’s house.147 
One family stated that although the rotating custody arrangement 
works, it has disadvantages.148 “Carting possessions around is tough . 
. . Suitcases, nighttime animals, half an outfit here, half there—no 
steady routine.”149 
 Another daily difficulty of rotating custody is the child’s inability 
to establish meaningful relationships with his or her friends, unless 
the parents live near each other.150 Additionally, when rotating cus-
tody arrangements involve long periods of custody, such as an 
arrangement where the child lives with one parent during the school 
year and with the other parent during the summer, the child may 
also have trouble maintaining relationships with friends.151 Even 
more worrisome is the contention that the interruptions of rotating 
custody may hinder the child’s ability to bond emotionally with either 
parent.152 
 Rotating custody may also have negative effects on the parents. 
One common complaint made by parents subject to rotating custody 
arrangements is that they cannot truly separate from each other.153 
However, many divorced couples with children could make this same 
complaint, regardless of the custody arrangement, because “[s]o 
many couples are legally divorced but emotionally still married; they 
simply carry on their marriages internally or through their chil-
dren.”154 Therefore, few divorced couples will ever fully terminate 
their relationship, especially where children are involved.155 
 Another challenge for parents in rotating custody arrangements is 
the resolution of decisions about the child’s life.156 Opponents of rotat-
ing custody argue that it is unrealistic to expect that divorced par-
ents can separate their marital and parental lives, and therefore, co-
operate when making decisions about the child.157 This argument, 
however, assumes that the divorced parents harbor hostile feelings 
toward each other, and that they do not mutually respect each 
other’s opinions.158 At least with time, divorced parents are more 
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likely to minimize the role of their marital lives, and instead place 
more emphasis on their parental lives, thereby permitting them to 
agree on decisions affecting their child. 
 Parents, like their children, may be inconvenienced by rotating 
custody arrangements. For instance, the children’s movement from 
home to home creates logistical problems for parents who have to 
spend time and money transporting them.159 Additional expenditures 
may be necessary to make the child feel comfortable in both 
houses.160 Parents may have to buy duplicate toys, personal belong-
ings, and extra clothes in order for the child’s surroundings to be fa-
miliar.161 
III.   JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER                                 
TO ORDER ROTATING CUSTODY 
 Because Mandell rejected the contention that section 61.121 abol-
ished the presumption against rotating custody, Florida courts con-
tinue to infrequently award rotating custody. Sometimes the applica-
tion of the presumption is justified. However, regardless of the Man-
dell decision, rotating custody is preferable for some divorcing cou-
ples and their children. 
A.   Justified Application of the Presumption 
 In addition to the Bienvenu-Gerscovich factors and the position of 
a majority of the districts that rotating custody should not be ordered 
when the parents do not get along,162 the Florida courts have recog-
nized other situations where rotating custody should not be or-
dered.163 Although judges and practitioners may not be presented 
with similar situations, assuming that they are, these cases may be 
useful in guiding their decisions or predictions. 
 For example, in Jones v. Jones,164 a modification order granting 
rotating custody was reversed; the fact that the wife sent the chil-
dren to boarding school and, in the husband’s opinion, practically 
abandoned the children, did not justify the rotating custody order. 
Similarly, a court is unlikely to order rotating custody simply be-
cause one parent is a teacher and the other is not.165 Also, “[r]otating 
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custody between two distant cities should not be imposed when the 
child is of school age.”166 
 Although psychologists’ and Guardian Ad Litem reports militate 
in favor of rotating custody,167 where the only other circumstance 
justifying rotating custody is the child’s stated preference, a court 
may not “surrender its discretion to psychologists or other experts 
testifying concerning the welfare of children where best interests are 
to be protected by the court.”168 Likewise, the fact that the parents 
are ages fifteen and sixteen does not justify an order of rotating 
custody.169 Finally, rotating custody is not warranted even when both 
parents and their families are competent and willing to provide an 
excellent environment for the child.170 
 Other sources can provide judges and attorneys with more gen-
eral, and therefore more practical, guidance. For instance, one au-
thority suggests that rotating custody may not be successful if the 
reason the parent seeks rotating custody is because the parent 
wants, but is afraid he or she will not get, sole custody, and is willing 
to settle for rotating custody.171 If rotating custody is awarded, prob-
lems may arise if one of the parents cannot accept the arrangement 
and cooperate with the other parent.172 In other words, if the parent’s 
desire to have sole custody outweighs his or her respect for the other 
parent’s decisions and opinions about the child, then the rotating 
custody arrangement will fail.173 
 When guilt compels a parent to seek rotating custody, a court 
should not order rotating custody. Some parents think that they 
should request rotating custody because, if they do not want custody 
of the child, it must mean that they do not love the child.174 As rotat-
ing custody becomes a more common scenario, the parents may feel 
more pressure to seek rotating custody.175 However, a rotating cus-
tody arrangement that is entered into because of societal and familial 
influences is not likely to be very successful.176 
 Besides guilt, other motivations inducing parents to seek rotating 
custody are vengeance and freedom.177 For example, seeking rotating 
custody is an effective way to retaliate against a parent who desires 
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sole custody of the child.178 Although this motive may be a good battle 
strategy, courts and attorneys should not order rotating custody 
when vengeance is the incentive for the request, as this is an indica-
tor that the parents do not get along. 
 The desire for more personal freedom influences some requests for 
rotating custody.179 While rotating custody arrangements do provide 
more freedom to the parents,180 that liberty should not be the pri-
mary reason for seeking rotating custody. In other words, parents 
should not use this option as a means to assume less responsibility 
for raising the children,181 because in rotating custody arrangements, 
both parents “have 100 percent of the responsibility 50 percent of the 
time.”182 
 Rotating custody also may not be successful when divorcing par-
ents answer any of the following questions negatively: 
 Do I think that my former spouse is a good parent? 
 Do I believe that the type of joint custody arrangement I want 
allows for the stability and consistency necessary for our child? 
 Am I willing to discuss matters related to our child with my for-
mer spouse? 
 Do my former spouse and I have compatible beliefs about raising 
children? 
 Am I willing to ask for help in settling major differences that 
might arise between my former spouse and I concerning our child? 
 As circumstances change, am I willing to make adjustments in 
our joint custody arrangement to maximize the potential for its 
success?183 
Although a negative answer to all or any of the questions may not 
signify that rotating custody will fail, parents who answer “no” to any 
of the questions should think carefully about entering into a rotating 
custody arrangement.184 
 A 1997 study concluded that psychologists are less likely to rec-
ommend rotating custody if all or some of the following five factors 
are present: (1) “Parents do not cooperate or communicate”; (2) “Con-
flict or hostility between parents”; (3) “Geographical distance be-
tween parents”; (4) “Family or domestic violence history”; (5) “Chil-
dren cannot adjust to transitions or are too young.”185 The majority of 
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the psychologists interviewed agreed that the two most important 
considerations when deciding whether to recommend rotating cus-
tody are the parents’ ability to cooperate and communicate, and the 
amount of hostility between the parents.186 Additionally, forty-one 
percent thought that the proximity of the parents’ homes was impor-
tant, twenty-eight percent considered family or domestic violence as 
significant, and twenty-two percent thought that the child’s ability to 
adjust or the child’s age was important.187 
1.   When Rotating Custody Should be Ordered 
 The Second, Third, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal agree that 
rotating custody should only be ordered when the divorced parents 
can communicate and cooperate.188 However, the Fourth and First 
District Courts of Appeal cite parental hostility as a factor in favor of 
ordering rotating custody.189 Psychologists agree with the former po-
sition that antagonism militates in favor of applying the presumption 
against rotating custody.190 
 Bienvenu was the first case to indicate that parental hostility was 
not a special circumstance justifying a rotating custody arrange-
ment.191 The court reversed the trial judge’s order of rotating custody 
to parents who were involved in a bitter custody battle.192 The court 
reasoned that a presumption against rotating custody applies when 
the “mother and father are . . . mutually antagonistic.”193 
 The Fifth District Court of Appeal first demonstrated its commit-
ment to the idea that hostility militates in favor of applying the pre-
sumption against rotating custody in Garvie v. Garvie.194 The court 
reversed a rotating custody order, in part, because the parents could 
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not get along.195 Applying the Bienvenu-Gerscovich factors, the court 
concluded that: 
[A]lthough the record does not establish that rotating custody 
would have a disruptive effect on the child, it does establish that 
the parties have a great deal of animosity toward each other and 
have difficulty conferring on issues affecting the child. Thus, we 
can reasonably foresee that this mutual antagonism, coupled with 
this inability to communicate, would have a distressing effect on 
the child in a rotating custody arrangement.196 
Subsequently, other courts in the Fifth District followed Garvie, cit-
ing similar rationales for overturning rotating custody orders.197 
 The First and Fourth Districts disagree, and conversely argue, 
that hostility between the parents is a special circumstance that 
overrides the presumption against rotating custody.198 In Sullivan v. 
Sullivan,199 for example, the court affirmed a rotating custody order 
where the parents did not live far apart, where the length of each pe-
riod of custody was reasonable, where the child was not yet of school 
age, and where the mother’s attitude was antagonistic. Evidence of 
the wife’s hostile attitude included her refusal to allow the father to 
visit the child, her denial of his paternity, and her behavior during 
the hearing.200 The trial court stated that “[t]he child is at a young 
and impressionable age and given the hostility evident in the 
mother’s attitude, demeanor and testimony, the court is concerned 
whether or not she will imbue the child with her attitude against the 
father.”201 Therefore, to preclude the possibility that the mother 
would turn the child against the father, the trial court ordered rotat-
ing custody and the appellate court supported its decision.202 
 The Fourth District Court of Appeal follows an identical approach, 
reversing rotating custody orders when “there is no evidence to indi-
cate that the parties harbor negative attitudes or hostility toward 
each other.”203 Rotating custody was also ordered by a trial court 
when the parental sentiments were less than hostile. In Hosein v. 
Hosein,204 the trial court had ordered rotating custody because the 
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parties had a tendency to unilaterally make decisions about the 
child. Rotating custody would prevent one parent from prohibiting 
the other parent’s involvement in the child’s life.205 However, it is un-
certain whether an appellate court would sanction this less-than-
hostile standard because the rotating custody order was remanded so 
the court could apply the Bienvenu-Gerscovich factors.206 
 The Second District Court of Appeal first recognized the conflict 
between the district courts of appeal in Boardman v. Roy.207 The 
Boardman court affirmed the trial court’s rotating custody order, but 
disagreed with the trial court’s reliance on the parents’ hostility as a 
factor overcoming the presumption against rotating custody.208 The 
court opposed the First and Fourth Districts’ consideration of paren-
tal animosity as a factor militating in favor of rotating custody be-
cause that policy would encourage “untoward conduct with the hope 
that it will result in rotating custody.”209 The court also reasoned that 
the parents’ inability to get along would result in a failed rotating 
custody agreement.210 
 For determinations of child custody in non-rotating arrangements, 
the Florida Legislature suggests that one factor in favor of awarding 
physical custody to a parent is the fact that the parent “is more likely 
to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresi-
dential parent.”211 Furthermore, “[t]he willingness and ability of each 
parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child 
relationship between the child and the other parent” also militates in 
favor of awarding a parent physical custody.212 Therefore, because 
the legislature promotes friendly parenting in other child custody ar-
rangements, it is likely that it would agree with the view of the Sec-
ond, Third, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal that parental hostility 
does not militate in favor of rotating custody arrangements. 
 Psychologists agree with the Second, Third, and Fifth District 
Courts of Appeal. One survey of 201 psychologists revealed that two 
principle factors that psychologists consider when deciding whether 
to recommend rotating custody are the “[a]bility of the parents to 
separate their interpersonal difficulties from their parenting deci-
sions” and “[t]he amount of anger and bitterness between the par-
ents.”213 The survey concluded that rotating custody is preferred 
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when there is more communication and cooperation between the par-
ents, or at least the absence of conflict.214 
 Other authorities have reached similar conclusions. An article 
published in 1980 in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry sug-
gested that rotating custody is most successful when the parents are 
cooperative.215 The article determined that certain parental charac-
teristics are congruent with orders of rotating custody and stated 
that: 
[T]he most crucial and beneficial components of joint custody for 
the children lie in the attitudes, values, and behavior of their par-
ents. The cooperative and respectful relationship between the par-
ents for the purpose of child-rearing, and each parent’s support of 
the child’s relationship with the other parent, seemed to be more 
significant in helping the children adjust to the divorce than mak-
ing sure that the time the children spent with each parent was 
precisely equal.216 
A child custody guidebook for parents and mental health profession-
als employs similar language, stating that rotating custody should 
not be ordered unless the parents can cooperate, communicate, and 
are willing to compromise.217 A final authority standing for the 
proposition that a successful rotating custody arrangement requires 
cooperative parents concludes that rotating custody “should not be 
imposed on a fighting couple as a way of compromising or resolving 
the dispute.”218 Instead, rotating custody “should be a goal, an end for 
divorcing parents to work towards, assuming that both of them can 
see its value.”219 
 The accuracy of the conclusion that parental animosity should not 
weigh in favor of a rotating custody order is reflected by children’s 
adjustment to rotating custody. Children generally adjust more eas-
ily when cooperative parents voluntarily choose rotating custody.220 
When rotating custody is court-imposed on hostile parents, however, 
children may have more difficulty adjusting to the new situation.221 
Because children more readily adjust to rotating custody when the 
parents get along, the presence of parental animosity requires the 
application of the presumption against rotating custody. If the rule 
were otherwise, courts would be sanctioning a custody arrangement 
that children have difficulty adjusting to.  
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 If, however, rotating custody is ordered in a situation where the 
parents do not get along, the potential conflict and its impact on the 
child can be minimized. One suggestion is to limit exchanges of the 
child to public places, such as the child’s school, so that the parents 
can avoid contact and controversy.222 Therefore, rotating custody ar-
rangements may still be effective, even in the presence of hostile par-
ents, so long as both parents care about the child.223 
 Another important consideration justifying rotating custody is the 
child’s attachment to both parents, according to approximately 115 
out of 201 psychologists.224 The same survey revealed that other fac-
tors influencing psychologists to recommend rotating custody in-
cluded the parents’ emotional stability and desire to have a rotating 
custody arrangement.225 
 Rotating custody is only a viable option when “[b]oth parents are 
reasonably and equally capable of assuming the responsibilities of 
child rearing.”226 Capability of the parents includes availability and 
psychological stability.227 For example, if one parent cannot assume 
the financial obligations inherent in raising children, then rotating 
custody should not be ordered.228 
 Similarly, another authority attributes successful rotating custody 
arrangements to four factors: (1) “commitment to the arrangement,” 
(2) “the parents’ mutual support,” (3) “flexible sharing of responsibil-
ity,” and (4) “agreement on the implicit rules of the system.”229 Com-
mitment to the arrangement means that both parents believe that 
rotating custody is the best alternative.230 Mutual parental support 
connotes the idea that each parent encourages and facilitates the 
child’s relationship with the other parent.231 This relationship can be 
achieved when the ex-spouses trust each other’s parenting ability 
and promote the development of a relationship with the other par-
ent.232 If parents have mutual respect and the child is free to explore 
each relationship, the child will not suffer as greatly from the emo-
tional trauma of divorce.233 
 In successful rotating custody arrangements, parents must also be 
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able to flexibly share the responsibilities.234 Although parents do not 
have to see each other often, they must be willing to schedule and al-
locate responsibility.235 Furthermore, an emergency plan needs to be 
in place in case the parent is unable to perform his or her duty.236 
 Parents subject to a rotating custody arrangement must also 
agree upon the implicit rules, meaning that parents must “[w]ork out 
. . . how much contact to have, both as parents and as people; how 
much to overlap the two households; what kind, how much, and how 
to share information; whether and how to give the other parent criti-
cal or positive feedback about his or her parenting.”237 In other words, 
parents must learn how to co-exist as parents and friends, instead of 
spouses. If parents can make that transition, rotating custody ar-
rangements are likely to be successful. 
 Some authorities suggest that the instability of rotating custody 
arrangements is detrimental to younger children and, therefore, it 
should not be ordered when the children are young.238 However, Flor-
ida courts do not consider a child’s young age to militate in favor of 
applying the presumption against rotating custody.239 Likewise, Flor-
ida courts are not deterred from ordering rotating custody when the 
child is older, if the presence of other factors indicates that rotating 
custody would be in the child’s best interest.240 Therefore, although a 
child’s young age should be considered, it should only secondarily in-
fluence the decision whether to order rotating custody. Hence, where 
other factors demonstrate that rotating custody would be in the 
child’s best interest, courts should not be precluded from ordering 
such arrangements simply because the child is young. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Florida’s presumption against rotating custody should be abol-
ished in favor of a system that permits judges to order and approve 
rotating custody arrangements more frequently and more freely. As-
suming that the divorced parents can cooperate, communicate, re-
spect each other’s parental authority, and separate their past marital 
roles from their parental roles, rotating custody is the most fulfilling 
arrangement for both the parents and the child. Rotating custody 
promotes continued contact with both parents, thereby ameliorating 
the feeling of abandonment that many children in sole custody ar-
rangements experience. The child does not have to endure the emo-
tional trauma of choosing a residential parent and the parents are 
not subjected to the taxing adversarial process. Florida’s presump-
tion against rotating custody deprives parents and their children of 
these, and other, benefits. Because the child’s and the parents’ best 
interests are only harmed by this limitation, the Florida courts must 
be permitted to equally consider rotating custody as an option for 
families desiring and deserving its benefits. 
 
